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Revealed Preference Analysis with Normal Goods: 
Application to Cost-of-Living Indices†
By Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, 
Bram De Rock, and Khushboo Surana*
We present a revealed preference methodology for nonparametric 
demand analysis under the assumption of normal goods. Our meth-
odology is lexible in that it allows for imposing normality on any 
subset of goods. We show the usefulness of our methodology for 
empirical welfare analysis through cost-of-living indices. An illustra-
tion to US consumption data drawn from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) demonstrates that mild normality assumptions can 
substantially strengthen the empirical analysis. It obtains consider-
ably tighter bounds on cost-of-living indices and a signiicantly more 
informative classiication of  better-off and  worse-off individuals 
after the 2008 inancial crisis. (JEL D11, D12, E31, G01)
Changing  price-income regimes can have a substantive impact on individual demand patterns. The empirical analysis of the associated welfare effects has 
attracted considerable attention in the applied welfare literature. In the current paper, 
we propose a structural method for such welfare analysis that is intrinsically non-
parametric: it does not impose any parametric/functional structure on the individual 
utilities but merely exploits the preference information that is directly revealed by 
the observed consumption behavior. Particularly, we demonstrate that mild normal-
ity assumptions on the demand for (a subset of) goods can obtain a signiicantly 
informative analysis of individual cost-of-living indices. We show this through an 
empirical illustration to household demand data taken from the PSID, in which we 
analyze the welfare effects of the 2008 inancial crisis for a sample of singles in the 
United States.
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Welfare Evaluation and Counterfactual Demand Analysis.—The structural anal-
ysis of welfare effects associated with changing prices and/or incomes requires 
predicting demand in counterfactual  price-income regimes. This issue is standardly 
addressed by adopting a parametric approach, which assumes a speciic functional 
form for the consumers’ utility or expenditure functions.1 The parameters of this 
functional form are then estimated from the observed consumption behavior, and 
these estimations can be used to interpolate or extrapolate demand in unobserved 
 price-income situations. A main problem of this parametric approach is that it cru-
cially relies on some a priori assumed functional form for the individual preferences, 
which is typically  nonveriiable. This implies an intrinsic risk of speciication error.
We can avoid this speciication risk by adopting the nonparametric revealed pref-
erence approach that was initiated by Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) and 
further developed by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). Basically, 
this nonparametric approach develops testable implications for observed consump-
tion patterns (prices and quantities) that must hold under rational demand behavior 
associated with any  well-behaved utility function. These testable implications are 
then used as a basis for counterfactual demand predictions in the form of set iden-
tiication (producing bounds on possible demand responses in new  price-income 
regimes). By its very nature, this nonparametric approach avoids the possibility of 
erroneous conclusions following from a wrongly speciied functional form.
Revealed Preference Analysis and Normal Goods.—Although this nonparamet-
ric orientation of the revealed preference approach is conceptually appealing, its 
empirical usefulness is often put into question. Generally, an informative empirical 
analysis requires a rich dataset with high price variation and low income variation. 
In many observational settings, however, the opposite holds true (i.e., low price 
variation combined with high income variation). In such cases, the nonparametric 
testable implications have little empirical bite, and, correspondingly, the set identi-
ication results are not very informative (see, for example, Varian 1982 and Bronars 
1987 for detailed discussions). As an implication, the revealed preference method-
ology is then of limited practical value.
In the current paper, we show that this lack of power can be remediated by assum-
ing normality of the goods that are consumed. Normality is often a natural assump-
tion to make. Basically, a good is normal if its income expansion path is increasing. 
A convenient feature of our method is that we can impose normality without need-
ing to estimate the expansion path; our nonparametric testable implications apply to 
any expansion path that satisies normal demand. Moreover, our method applies to 
settings with any number of goods and can impose normality on any subset of these 
goods. The only assumption it makes is that normality holds for the observed prices, 
so avoiding the stronger hypothesis that normality must apply to any (observed or 
unobserved) price.
1 Popular functional forms in the literature are the  Cobb-Douglas, the translog (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 
1975), the almost ideal demand (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980), and quadratic almost ideal demand speciication 
(Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel 1997).
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In a recent series of papers, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003, 2007, 2008) 
and Blundell et al. (2015) also used the assumption of normal demand for observed 
prices to deal with the power issue associated with empirical revealed preference 
analysis. However, we see at least two main differences between the method pro-
posed by these authors and our novel method. First, they assume that normality 
holds for all goods simultaneously, whereas our method is equally applicable to nor-
mality for any subset of goods. Second, and more importantly, these authors exploit 
normality of demand by using (nonparametrically) estimated income expansion 
paths (assuming a repeated  cross-sectional dataset). As indicated above, our method 
avoids this prior estimation step (and associated statistical issues); it directly applies 
revealed preference restrictions (for normal demand) to the observed consumption 
choices. Interestingly, our empirical application shows that our method can yield an 
informative welfare analysis even with a short time series of (three) consumption 
observations per individual.
In another closely related paper, Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2018)—
henceforth, CDR—also establish revealed preference conditions for normal demand, 
with a main focus on the two goods setting. A irst crucial difference with the current 
paper is that CDR consider the stronger assumption that normality holds for all 
(observed and unobserved)  nonnegative prices, whereas we use the substantially 
weaker assumption that imposes normality (only) for the observed prices. Next, 
CDR focus on  so-called  WARP-consistent demand, implying that they do not exploit 
transitivity of preferences. In the current paper, however, we also explicitly consider 
the testable implications of transitivity. Rose (1958) showed that transitivity has 
no empirical bite in the two goods setting. As an implication, our testable impli-
cations will be weaker than the ones of CDR if there are only two goods (because 
of CDR’s stronger normality assumption; see above). For more than two goods, 
transitivity may have empirical bite, and thus, our testable implications may become 
more restrictive than the ones of CDR. Evidently, whether or not this is the case will 
crucially depend on the nature of the observed price regimes. Finally, while CDR’s 
conditions are necessary and suficient for rational demand that satisies normality 
when there are two goods, they are only necessary (but not suficient) for the general 
setting with more than two goods. By contrast, our testable implications provide a 
necessary and suficient characterization of rationality under normal demand that 
applies to any number of goods.
Empirical Welfare Analysis and Cost-of-living Indices.—We show that our 
revealed preference method can be used for a meaningful welfare analysis on the 
basis of cost-of-living indices. We demonstrate this through an empirical application 
to data drawn from the PSID. We select a balanced panel from the 2007, 2009, and 
2011 waves of the PSID to study the welfare effects of the 2008 inancial crisis. A 
large number of studies has analyzed these welfare effects since the onset of the 
crisis. As the crisis led to a substantial rise in unemployment, the principal focus so 
far has been on the extensive margin of labor supply (see, for example, Verick 2009, 
Hurd and Rohwedder 2010, Goodman and Mance 2011, Deaton 2012). By contrast, 
in our application, we concentrate on individuals who remained employed after the 
crisis.
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More speciically, our structural analysis assumes a model of rational labor sup-
ply for singles who spend their potential income on leisure, food, housing, and other 
goods, hereby imposing normality on all consumption categories except for leisure. 
To assess the empirical bite of the testable implications associated with normality, 
we also compute the empirical results for the rational labor supply model without 
normal demand. Our results show that imposing normality entails a substantially 
more powerful empirical analysis. In particular, we obtain considerably tighter 
bounds on cost-of-living indices and a signiicantly more informative classiication 
of  better-off and  worse-off individuals after the 2008 crisis.
Outline.—Section I develops the revealed preference characterization of utility 
maximization under normality assumptions. Section II introduces the cost-of-living 
index for our empirical welfare analysis. We also deine the  goodness-of-it and pre-
dictive success measures that we will use to evaluate the empirical performance of 
our normality assumptions. Section III presents our empirical application to PSID 
data. Section IV concludes.
I. Rational Demand with Normal Goods
Our main theoretical result deines the testable implications for the observed 
demand behavior to be consistent with rationality (i.e., utility maximization) and 
normality of (a subset of) the consumed goods. To this end, we irst deine the 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) in terms of Hicksian demand 
bundles that correspond to the observed prices and associated utility levels (for 
the given quantity bundles). Imposing normality boils down to restricting these 
Hicksian demand bundles at any observed price regime to be monotone in utility 
(Fisher 1990). Basically, our testable revealed preference conditions verify whether 
there exists at least one possible speciication of the utility levels and Hicksian 
demand bundles that satisfy this requirement. If so, we cannot reject the joint 
hypothesis of normality and rational behavior.
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).—Throughout, we focus on 
a inite set  T of observed prices and corresponding quantities. For each consump-
tion observation  t ∈ T , let  q t ∈  ℝ + 
n and  p t ∈  ℝ ++ 
n denote the (column) vectors 
of quantities and prices, respectively. This deines the dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T . We 
say that  S is “rationalizable” if there exists a utility function  u( ⋅ ) such that for each 
observation  t ∈ T ,  q t maximizes this function  u( ⋅ ) over all affordable bundles for 
the given prices  p t and outlay  x t =  p t  q t . Throughout, we will assume utility func-
tions that are continuous and strictly monotone.
DEFINITION 1: A dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T is rationalizable if there exists a con-
tinuous and strictly monotone utility function  u :  ℝ + 
n → ℝ such that for all  t ∈ T 
and  x t =  p t  q t ,
  q t ∈ arg max u (q) subject to  p t q ≤  x t .
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 Varian (1982) has shown that GARP deines a necessary and suficient condition 
for a dataset  S to be rationalizable. Thus, checking rationalizability boils down to 
verifying whether or not the set  S satisies GARP. To formally deine this GARP 
requirement, we will need the following concepts.
DEFINITION 2: Consider a dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T . We say that  q t ,  t ∈ T , 
is directly revealed preferred to the bundle  q v ,  v ∈ T , if  p t  q t ≥  p t  q v . We denote 
this as  q t  R 
D  q v . Next, we say that  q t is strictly directly revealed preferred to  q v 
if  p t  q t >  p t  q v . We denote this as  q t  P 
D  q v . Finally, we say that  q t is revealed pre-
ferred to  q v if there exists a ( possibly empty) sequence  u, s, …, r ∈ T such that
  q t  R 
D  q u ,  q u  R 
D  q s , …,  q r  R 
D  q v .
We denote this as  q t R  q v .
Thus, the quantity bundle  q t is directly revealed preferred to the bundle  q v 
(i.e.,  q t  R 
D  q v ) if  q v was affordable when bundle  q t was chosen (i.e.,  p t  q t ≥  p t  q v ). 
If the inequality is strict (i.e.,  p t  q t >  p t  q v ), then  q t is strictly directly revealed 
preferred to  q v (i.e.,  q t  P 
D  q v ). Finally, from the direct revealed preference rela-
tions, we can deine the more general concept of (direct or indirect) revealed 
preference relations by exploiting transitivity of preferences (i.e.,  q t R  q v follows 
from  q t  R 
D  q u ,  q u  R 
D  q s , … ,  q r  R 
D  q v ).
We can now deine GARP.
DEFINITION 3: A dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T satisies GARP if for all  t, v ∈ T , 
 q t R  q v implies not  q v  P 
D  q t .
In words, a dataset  S satisies GARP if for any two observed bundles  q t and  q v , 
 q t R  q v implies that  q v is not strictly directly revealed preferred to  q t (i.e., not  q v  P 
D  q t ). 
Intuitively, GARP excludes that bundle  q t is revealed preferred to  q v while, at the same 
time,  q t was affordable at a strictly lower cost when  q v was purchased.
In what follows, we will focus on a less standard reformulation of the GARP 
condition in Deinition 3. This alternative formulation will be instrumental for our 
characterization of rationalizable consumer behavior under normal demand. It is 
contained in the following result.2
PROPOSITION 1: A dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T satisies GARP if and only if there 
exist numbers  ( u t ) t∈T such that for all  s, t ∈ T 
 •  if  u t ≥  u s , then  p s  q s ≤  p s  q t ;
 •  if  u t >  u s , then  p s  q s <  p s  q t .
2 This equivalent reformulation of GARP has been used in the literature on nonparametric production analysis. 
We refer to Varian (1984, Theorem 2) for a formal proof of Proposition 1.
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The second equivalence shows that a dataset  S can be veriied by checking the exis-
tence of “utility numbers”  u t that satisfy a series of “if-then” conditions. Intuitively, 
each number  u t represents the consumer’s utility level associated with the bundle  q t . 
If the utility level at observation  t is (strictly) above the utility level at observation 
s (i.e.,  u t ≥ (>)  u s ), then the bundle  q t must be (strictly) more expensive than the 
bundle  q s at the prices  p s .
 Normality-extended GARP ( N-GARP).—Let  M ⊆ {1, …, n} be a subset of the 
goods that are consumed. We say that a dataset  S is rationalizable by normal demand 
on the subset  M if there exists a well-behaved utility function that (i) represents each 
observed bundle  q t as utility maximizing under (ii) the additional requirement that 
for each good  i ∈ M , the income expansion path at the observed prices has a posi-
tive slope. Formally, we have the following deinition.
DEFINITION 4: A dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T is rationalizable by normal demand on 
the subset  M  (M ⊆ {1, …, n}) if there exists a continuous and strictly monotone 
utility function  u :  핉 + 
n → 핉 and functions  q t :  핉 + →  핉 + 
n such that for all  t ∈ T 
and  x t =  p t  q t ,
 •  q t (x) ∈ arg max u(q) subject to   p t q ≤ x ,
 •  q t 
i(x) is monotone in  x for all  i ∈ M ,
 •  q t =  q t ( x t ) .
In this deinition, the function  q t ( ⋅ ) represents the income expansion path at 
the observed prices  p t , deining the quantities demanded by the consumer at the 
 price-income pair  (  p t , x) for any value of  x . Deinition 4 deines three conditions 
for the functions  u( ⋅ ) and  q t ( ⋅ ) . The irst condition states that for all income levels 
x ,  q t (x) maximizes the function  u( ⋅ ) over all affordable bundles at prices  p t and 
income  x . The second condition imposes that  q t 
i(x) is increasing in  x , meaning that 
good  i ∈ M is normal at prices  p t . The last condition requires that  q t ( x t ) equals the 
observed demand  q t for the observed income/outlay  x t  (=  p t  q t ) and prices  p t .
In order to better grasp the meaning of our main result (captured by Proposition 2 
below), we make use of dual demand theory. If utility functions are continuous and 
strictly monotone, then every utility maximization problem has a dual expenditure 
minimization problem where the objective is to minimize expenditures for a given 
price vector conditional upon a certain level of utility:
  v (p, x) =  max q 
 
 u (q) subject to pq ≤ x 

  
primal utility max problem
 
 
 ;
  e (p, u) =  min q 
 
 pq subject to u (q) ≥ u   

 
dual expenditure min problem
 
 
.
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The indirect utility function, here denoted by  v( p, x) , is the inverse of the expen-
diture function, denoted by  e( p, u) , in the sense that for all prices  p , utility levels  u , 
and income levels  x , we have
  v (p, e (p, u) ) = u and e (p, v (p, x) ) = x .
The expenditure function is increasing in utility  u , and the indirect utility function 
is increasing in income  x . In addition, if they are unique, the solution to the utility 
maximization problem,  q( p, x) , which is called the Marshallian demand function, 
and the solution to the expenditure minimization problem,  h( p, u) , which is called 
the Hicksian demand function, are related in the following sense:
  q (p, e (p, u) ) = h (p, u) and h (p, v (p, x) ) = q (p, x) .
Let us then consider two income levels  x and  x ′, with  x ≥ x′ , and a good  i ∈ M . 
If  q i ( p, x) satisies normality, then
  q i (p, x) ≥  q 
i (p, x′) ,
and therefore, by the identity above,
  h i (p, v (p, x) ) ≥  h 
i (p, v (p, x′) ) .
Given that  v( p, x) is increasing in income  x , this shows that normality of  q i implies 
that the Hicksian demand function  h i ( p, u) is increasing in utility  u . Vice versa, if we 
take two utility levels  u and  u′ with  u ≥ u′ , then monotonicity of  h i in  u requires
  h i (p, u) ≥  h 
i (p, u′) ⇔  q 
i (p, e (p, u) ) ≥  q 
i (p, e (p, u′) ) .
As  e( p, u) is increasing in  u , this shows that  q i must be increasing in  x , i.e., good 
i is a normal good. Summarizing, we conclude that monotonicity (normality) of 
 q i ( p, x) in  x is equivalent to monotonicity of the Hicksian demand  h i ( p, u) in  u .3
We can use this equivalence to establish the revealed preference characterization 
of rationalizable behavior as speciied in Deinition 4. This characterization pro-
vides nonparametric testable implications for the observed dataset  S to be consistent 
with utility maximization under the additional assumption of normal demand. In 
particular, we can show that rationalizability under normal demand holds if and only 
if the dataset  S satisies the  N-GARP.
3 We refer to Fisher (1990) for a more formal statement of this argument.
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DEFINITION 5: For  M ⊆ {1, …, n} , a dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T satisies  N-GARP 
if there exist numbers  ( u t ) t∈T and vectors  ( h t,v ) t,v∈T ( h t,v ∈  핉 + 
n ) such that for all 
r, s, t, v ∈ T ,
 •  h t,t =  q t ;
 •  if  u t ≥  u v , then  p r  h r,v ≤  p r  h s,t ;
 •  if  u t >  u v , then  p r  h r,v <  p r  h s,t ;
 •  if  u t ≥  u v , then  h r,v 
i ≤  h r,t 
i for all i ∈ M .
The following proposition contains our main theoretical result.4
PROPOSITION 2: A dataset  S =  {(  p t ,  q t )} t∈T is rationalizable by normal demand 
on the subset  M (M ⊆ {1, …, n}) if and only if it satisies  N-GARP.
Similar to Proposition 1, we obtain that rationalizability imposes the existence 
of utility numbers  u t that satisfy a series of  if-then conditions. In our  N-GARP dei-
nition, each vector  h t,v represents the Hicksian demand bundle at prices  p t for the 
utility level associated with the bundle  q v (captured by the number  u v ). In other 
words,  h t,v = h(  p t ,  u v ) .
Rationalizability requires the numbers  u t and vectors  h t,v to satisfy the four conditions 
in Deinition 5. The irst condition states for each observation  t ∈ T that the Hicksian 
demand  h t,t = h(  p t ,  u t ) must equal the observed Marshallian demand  q t = q(  p t ,  x t ) . 
The second and third conditions impose GARP (as formulated in Proposition 1) on 
the sets  (  p t ,  h t,v ) t,v∈T , which consist of observed prices  p t and Hicksian demand vectors 
 h t,v = h(  p t ,  u v ) . To grasp the intuition behind these conditions, assume that  u t ≥  u v . 
Then,  h r,v = h(  p r ,  u v ) represents the Hicksian demand at prices  p r and utility level  u v , 
which is situated on the intersection of the indifference curve of  u v and the hyperplane 
(tangent to this indifference curve) with slope  p r . Now, given that  u t ≥  u v , it must 
be that all bundles that obtain utility level  u t are above this hyperplane (because all 
bundles below the hyperplane have utility levels below  u v ). Formally, for all  q with 
 u(q) =  u t , we must have  p r  h r,v ≤  p r q . Then, given that  u( h s,t ) = u(h(  p s ,  u t )) =  u t , 
it follows that  p r  h r,v ≤  p r  h s,t , which gives the second condition. The third condition 
has a similar interpretation. Finally, the fourth condition requires that the Hicksian 
quantities for each good  i ∈ M are monotonically increasing in utility, which corre-
sponds to normal demand, i.e., if  u t ≥  u v , then  h r,v 
i =  h i (  p r ,  u v ) ≤  h 
i (  p r ,  u t ) =  h r,t 
i .5
Figure  1 presents a graphical illustration of the  N-GARP condition for a set-
ting with two normal goods. The igure shows two indifference curves correspond-
ing to utility levels  u 1 and  u 2 , with  u 2 >  u 1 . The two budget lines correspond 
4 Online Appendix I contains the proof of Proposition 2.
5 In principle, we can restrict the normality restriction to be imposed only on certain income regions. For exam-
ple, suppose that we only want to impose normal demands on the income range  [  y 
¯
r ,  y 
–
r ] for prices  p r ; then it sufices 
to modify the fourth condition in Deinition 5 as follows:
  if  u t ≥  u v ,  p r  h r,v =  y r,v ,  p r  h r,t =  y r,t , and  y r,v ,  y r,t ∈  [ y 
¯
r ,  y 
–
r ] ,
 then  h r,v 
i ≤  h r,t 
i for all i ∈ M .
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to  observation  (  p 1 ,  q 1 ) = (  p 1 ,  h 1,1 ) , which obtains utility level  u 1 , and observa-
tion  (  p 2 ,  q 2 ) = (  p 2 ,  h 2,2 ) , which obtains utility level  u 2 . We also depict two aux-
iliary,  dashed budget lines that are parallel to the observed budget lines (i.e., they 
correspond to the same relative prices). The (unobserved) Hicksian demand  h 2,1 
 corresponds to the bundle that would give the utility level  u 1 at prices  p 2 . Similarly,  h 1,2 
is  the bundle that would give utility level  u 2 at prices  p 1 . The  N-GARP condition 
requires that these (observed and unobserved) demands satisfy GARP and 
that  h 2,1 ≤  h 2,2 and  h 1,1 ≤  h 1,2 . In reality, however, we do not observe these indif-
ference curves, and, therefore, the  N-GARP condition only imposes that it must be 
possible to construct hypothetical bundles  h 1,2 and  h 2,1 that satisfy these requirements.
When comparing the conditions in Proposition 1 with those in Deinition 5, it is 
clear that  N-GARP generally implies stronger rationalizability requirements than 
GARP.  N-GARP reduces to GARP (only) in the limiting case that does not impose 
normality for any good. We illustrate the difference between  N-GARP and GARP 
in Example 1, which contains a dataset that satisies GARP but violates  N-GARP. 
It indicates that imposing normality can yield a more powerful revealed preference 
analysis. This is an attractive feature as normality assumptions are often little debat-
able and thus easy to make.
Finally, in online Appendix II, we show that the  N-GARP condition in Deinition 5 
can be reformulated in terms of inequality constraints that are linear in unknowns 
and characterized by (binary) integer variables. These linear inequality constraints 
are easily operationalized, which is convenient from an application point of view.6
6 For example, we used the software package IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio for our empirical appli-
cation in Section III.
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Figure 1. Illustrative Example
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Example 1: We illustrate the difference between  N-GARP and GARP by means 
of a simple numerical example using a dataset  S with two goods ( n = 2 ) and two 
observations ( T = {1, 2} ):
  p 1 =  [ 4 4] ,  p 2 =  [ 
3
 
5] ,  q 1 =  [ 
8
 
1] ,  q 2 =  [ 
4
 
10
 ] .
Figure  2 depicts the two quantity bundles and associated budget sets. From this 
igure, it is easy to verify that the set  S satisies GARP. In particular, the budget 
lines do not cross, which automatically implies consistency with GARP. More for-
mally, referring to Proposition 1, we have  p 1  q 1 = 36,  p 1  q 2 = 56,  p 2  q 1 = 29, 
and  p 2  q 2 = 62 . Then, using  u 1 = 0.1 and  u 2 = 0.2 obtains that all conditions in 
Proposition 1 are satisied.
Next, we can show that the same dataset  S violates  N-GARP for  M = {1, 2} , i.e., 
both goods are assumed to be normal goods. In particular, we prove that there do not 
exist numbers  u 1 ,  u 2 and vectors  h 1,1 ,  h 1,2 ,  h 2,1 ,  h 2,2 that simultaneously meet the four 
conditions in Deinition 5. To see this, we begin by noting that the irst  N-GARP 
condition imposes
(1)  h 1,1 =  q 1 =  [ 8 1] , and  h 2,2 =  q 2 =  [ 
4
 
10
 ] .
In addition, the second  N-GARP condition (using that  u 2 ≥  u 2 ) imposes
(2)  p 1  h 1,2 ≤  p 1  h 2,2 and  p 2  h 2,2 ≤  p 2  h 1,2 .
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Figure 2. Example Dataset that Violates  N-GARP but Not GARP
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Combining (1) and (2) obtains (using superscripts to indicate the quantities of goods 
1 and 2)
  4  h 1,2 
1 + 4  h 1,2 
2 ≤ 56 ,
  62 ≤ 3  h 1,2 
1 + 5  h 1,2 
2 .
These two inequalities together imply
(3)  62 ≤ 3 h 1,2 
1 + 5 h 1,2 
2 ≤ 3 h 1,2 
1 + 5 (14 −  h 1,2 1 ) ⇔  h 1,2 1 ≤ 4 .
On the other hand, because  p 1  q 1,1 = 36 <  p 1  q 2,2 = 56 , the third  N-GARP con-
dition in Proposition 5 requires
  u 1 <  u 2 .
Then, the fourth  N-GARP condition imposes (using that goods  1 and  2 are both 
normal)
  h 1,1 ≤  h 1,2 .
Combined with (1), this entails
  h 1,2 
1 ≥ 8 ,
which contradicts (3). Thus, we conclude that  N-GARP is violated.
We can also graphically illustrate this  N-GARP violation in Figure 2. To see this, 
we irst note that the Hicksian demand  h 1,2 should lie below the dashed line asso-
ciated with the budget  p 1  q 2 . Also, if both goods are normal at the prices  p 1 , it must 
hold that  h 1,2 contains more of both goods 1 and 2 than  q 1 (i.e.,  h 1,2 ≥  q 1 ). Taken 
together, we conclude that  h 1,2 is situated in the triangular region formed by the 
 thick-dashed lines. Then, the conclusion that  N-GARP is violated follows from the 
observation that no  h 1,2 in this region is consistent with rationalizability of the con-
sumption observation  (  p 2 ,  q 2 ) . Speciically, any such  q 1,2 is strictly less expensive 
than the bundle  q 2 at prices  p 2 . As an implication, for the outlay  p 2  q 2 and prices  p 2 
associated with the quantity bundle  q 2 , the consumer could have chosen bundles 
strictly better than  h 1,2 . This implies that  h 1,2 and  q 2 cannot yield the same utility 
value for a strictly monotone utility function.
II. Cost of Living, Goodness-of-it, and Predictive Success
In this section, we introduce some additional concepts and tools that will be use-
ful for our following application. First, we show how our testable conditions for 
normal demand can be used to identify cost-of-living indices for comparing indi-
vidual welfare in alternative  price-income regimes. Next, in their original formula-
tion, our revealed preference conditions for rational behavior under normal demand 
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deine “exact” tests: data either satisfy the requirements or not. In our empirical 
application, we will use an Afriat-type Critical Cost Eficiency Index (CCEI) to 
assess how closely behavior complies with rational behavior. This index will serve 
as a  goodness-of-it measure that has a speciic interpretation as capturing the eco-
nomic signiicance of violations of our testable implications. Finally, we present the 
predictive success measure that we will use in Section III to compare the empirical 
performance of the alternative normality assumptions under study.
Cost-of-living Indices.—An important application of empirical demand analy-
sis consists of comparing consumers’ welfare in alternative  price-income regimes. 
More speciically, for two consumption observations  (  p t ,  q t ) and  (  p r ,  q r ) , we not only 
wish to know which combination is (revealed) “better” by the consumer, but also 
“how much better.” As utility theory is ordinal in nature, there is no unique answer to 
this last question. A popular method makes use of the money metric utility concept 
that was introduced by Samuelson (1974). In what follows, we will use this money 
metric representation of individual utility to compute cost-of-living indices associ-
ated with different  price-income situations. Technically, we adapt the nonparamet-
ric method that was developed by Varian (1982), based on the GARP concept in 
Deinition 3.7 We will show that our  N-GARP characterization in Deinition 5 easily 
allows for computing lower and upper bounds on individuals’ cost-of-living indices. 
This effectively set identiies these indices using the assumption of rationalizability 
under normal demand.
The money metric utility function gives the minimum expenditure required in 
observation  t (with  price-income pair  (  p t ,  x t ) ) to attain the same utility level as under 
some reference  price-income regime  (  p r ,  x r ) . Formally, it is deined as
  μ ( p t ;  p r ,  x r ) ≡ e ( p t , v ( p r ,  x r ) ) ,
with  e( p, u) the expenditure function quantifying the minimum income required to 
attain utility  u at prices  p and  v( p, x) the indirect utility function giving the maxi-
mum utility level at prices  p and income  x . In our  setup, the vector  q t,r represents 
Hicksian demand at price  p t and utility level  u r , which itself equals  v (  p r ,  x r ) . Thus, 
we can simply write
  μ ( p t ;  p r ,  x r ) = e ( p t ,  u r ) =  p t h ( p t ,  u r ) =  p t  h t,r .
Then, using our  N-GARP characterization of rationalizable consumer behavior 
under normal demand, we can deine upper (or lower) bounds on  μ(  p t ;  p r ,  x r ) by 
maximizing (or minimizing)  p t  q t,r subject to the conditions in Deinition 5. This 
implies optimization problems with a linear objective and linear inequality con-
straints that are characterized by integer variables (see also online Appendix II). It 
7 Varian (1982) refers to the money metric utility function as income compensation function. He considers wel-
fare comparisons between  price-income situations that are possibly unobserved. In the current paper, our focus is on 
comparing observed  price-income situations. Under speciic assumptions regarding unobserved prices, it is fairly 
easy to extend our following reasoning to welfare comparisons that involve unobserved  price-income regimes.
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deines an interval set of possible values for  μ(  p t ;  p r ,  x r ) under the given normality 
assumptions.
In a following step, we can compare the welfare of some evaluated individual in 
consumption observation  t and reference observation  r by using the cost-of-living 
index
  c t,r =  
 x t − μ ( p t ;  p r ,  x r ) 
  _____________ x t 
 =  
 x t −  p t  h t,r 
 _ x t 
 .
In this expression, the numerator  x t − μ(  p t ;  p r ,  x r ) deines the compensating variation 
associated with the price change from  p r to  p t . It measures the difference between the 
individual’s potential income in the decision situation  t (i.e.,  x t ) and the income needed 
by the same individual under the prices  p t to be equally well off, as in the reference 
situation  r (i.e.,  μ(  p t ;  p r ,  x r ) ). To obtain the cost-of-living index  c t,r , we divide this 
compensating variation by the available income in observation  t . This compares the 
individual’s welfare in  t relative to  r . If  c t,r exceeds zero, the individual is better off in 
t than in  r . Conversely, if  c t,r is below zero, the individual is worse off in  t than in  r .
Similar to before, our nonparametric characterization of rationalizable demand 
behavior allows us to nonparametrically identify upper and lower bounds on  c t,r 
(using set identiication of  μ(  p t ;  p r ,  x r ) ). These nonparametric bounds apply to any 
utility speciication that rationalizes the observed consumption behavior in terms 
of normal demand. In our empirical application, we will conclude that an individ-
ual is better off in situation  t than in situation  r if the lower bound of  c t,r is above 
zero. It means that for every speciication of the individual utilities that rationalizes 
the observed consumption behavior, we obtain a value for  c t,r that exceeds zero. 
Similarly, we can conclude that the individual is worse off in  t than in  r if the upper 
bound of  c t,r is below zero. Finally, if the lower and upper bounds have opposite 
signs, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the individual is equally well off in both 
decision situations: we are unable to robustly (i.e., for any speciication of the ratio-
nalizing utilities) conclude that the individual is better or worse off in  t than in  r .
 Goodness-of-it.—The revealed preference characterization in Deinition 5 allows 
us to deine sharp tests for rationalizable consumption behavior: either the data sat-
isfy the testable  N-GARP conditions or they do not. When the data do not satisfy 
these exact conditions, it is often interesting to empirically evaluate the degree of 
violation. For example, it may happen that the data are close to satisfying the exact 
rationalizability conditions, and we may want to include such almost rationalizable 
data in our further empirical analysis. To this end, we extend Afriat’s (1973) notion 
of CCEI to our speciic setting. Intuitively, the CCEI quantiies the  goodness-of-it 
of the rationalizability conditions in terms of minimal adjustments of the observed 
expenditure levels that are needed to exclude violations of the nonparametric ratio-
nalizability conditions. In other words, it quantiies the error that must be accounted 
for such that the (corrected) data satisfy the rationality restrictions.8
8 The CCEI was originally introduced by Afriat (1973) and further developed by Varian (1990). Choi et al. 
(2014) used the CCEI in a large-scale ield experiment as a measure of consumers’ decision-making quality. 
Intuitively, they interpret low  CCEI values as revealing optimization errors arising from imperfect decision-making 
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Formally, to apply the CCEI concept to our  N-GARP characterization, we intro-
duce a parameter  e ∈ [0, 1] . Correspondingly, we adjust the last three (if-then) con-
ditions in Deinition 5 for which  r = v while keeping the other conditions intact. 
That is, we only change the conditions for which  h r,v is equal to the observed bun-
dle  q v . This obtains the following adapted conditions (for all  r, s, t, v ∈ T ):
 • if  u t ≥  u v , then  e p v  q v ≤  p v  h s,t ,
 • if  u t >  u v , then  e p v  q v <  p v  h s,t ,
 • if  u t ≥  u v , then  e q v 
i ≤  h v,t for all  i ∈ M .
For a given dataset  S , the CCEI equals the highest value of  e such that the consump-
tion observations satisfy these adjusted rationalizability conditions.9 Obviously, 
higher  CCEI values signal a better it of the rationalizability conditions. Next, as 
argued by Apesteguia and Ballester (2015, section V), the CCEI has two properties 
that are speciically attractive from a practical point of view. First, it satisies conti-
nuity, which means that it never increases with the number of observations. Second, 
the CCEI satisies rationality, which implies that it equals one if and only if the data 
are (exactly) rationalizable.
Let  e ∗ represent the CCEI of a given dataset  S . Then, we can deine the adjusted 
revealed preference test which, by construction, satisies the modiied  N-GARP 
restrictions in Deinition 5. For this adjusted test, we can compute cost-of-liv-
ing indices by using the nonparametric procedure outlined above. In the follow-
ing section, our main empirical analysis will do so for the individuals with  CCEI 
values  e ∗ ≥ 0.99 , which means that the observed behavior is suficiently close to 
rationalizability.
Predictive Success.—One may be inclined to compare the empirical performance 
of alternative revealed preference conditions by comparing their pass rate, i.e., the 
proportion of individuals passing the conditions. However, this practice can be very 
misleading if one rationalizability condition is structurally weaker than the other. 
For example, any demand behavior that meets  N-GARP will by construction also 
satisfy GARP (but not vice versa). Thus, the pass rate for  N-GARP can never exceed 
the pass rate for GARP.
In order to solve this issue, one should account for the empirical stringency of the 
revealed preference conditions. A widely used measure for the power of revealed 
preference conditions is the  so-called Bronars index (Bronars 1987). This Bronars 
power computes the fraction of (simulated) random datasets that violate the ratio-
nalizability conditions subject to testing. A random dataset is then constructed by 
randomly selecting bundles from each of the observed budget hyperplanes. In gen-
eral, higher power values reveal more stringent revealed preference conditions. 
Thus, if one condition is weaker than the other, then its power will also be lower. 
For example, the power of GARP will never exceed the power of  N-GARP.
quality. We may use a similar interpretation of the CCEI results in our empirical application in Section III. See also 
Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) for related discussions. 
9 See online Appendix B for more information concerning the computation of the CCEI.
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Selten (1991) suggested to combine the pass rate and power of a given test into a 
 single-dimensional measure of “predictive success,” which is computed as
  predictive success = pass rate −  (1 − power) 
and always situated between  −1 and  1 .10 A well-performing revealed preference 
condition has a predictive success measure that is close to one, as this reveals both 
a high pass rate and high power; many observed individuals pass the test while 
almost no random behavior passes the test. A predictive success measure below 
zero implies that the pass rate for the randomly generated data exceeds the one 
for the observed data. This indicates the—obviously undesirable—situation that the 
revealed preference condition its random behavior better than actual behavior. In 
principle, the higher the measure of predictive success, the better the empirical it 
of the demand model that is tested. Demuynck (2015) introduced statistical tests for 
differences in predictive success associated with alternative behavioral models. We 
will use these statistical tools in our following application.
III. Illustrative Application
To evaluate the welfare effects of the 2008 inancial crisis, we make use of a 
balanced panel drawn from the 2007, 2009, and 2011 waves of the PSID. By con-
sidering only three PSID waves, we can show that our methodology enables an 
informative empirical analysis even for short time series of consumption observa-
tions.11 Moreover, it seems more reasonable to assume stable individual preferences 
over a shorter time period. In online Appendix IV, we demonstrate the robustness 
of our main qualitative conclusions for a longer panel containing four consumption 
observations per individual (adding the 2013 PSID wave to our original dataset). 
This extra analysis also allows us to study the impact of the crisis over a longer time 
period.
Data and Setup.—The PSID, which was initiated in 1968, is a widely used survey 
of a national representative sample of 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in 
the United States. The dataset contains information on income, wealth, health, mar-
riage, childbearing, child development, education, and other  sociodemographic vari-
ables. Since 1999, the panel also provides additional expenditure information on a 
detailed set of consumption categories (see Blundell, Pistaferri, and  Saporta-Eksten 
2016 for more details).
Our empirical analysis speciically focuses on the welfare effects of the 2008 crisis 
for singles (with and without children). Thus, we exclude couples from our investi-
gation, which also conveniently avoids preference aggregation issues associated with 
10 Selten’s measure was popularized for revealed preference tests by Beatty and Crawford (2011).
11 In principle, it is possible to use our methodology with only two consumption observations per individual. 
However, it can be shown that in such a case, the  N-GARP-based lower bounds on the cost-of-living indices always 
equal the  GARP-based lower bounds by construction. Thus, by using three consumption observations per individ-
ual, we can illustrate the usefulness of normality assumptions for obtaining lower bounds that are more informative 
than the  GARP-based bounds.
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the welfare analysis of  multiperson households.12 We concentrate on individuals 
who are situated on the intensive margin of labor supply; that is, our subjects are 
actively working on the labor market in each period under study. We excluded the 
 self-employed to avoid issues regarding the imputation of wages and the separation 
of consumption from  work-related expenditures. After excluding observations with 
missing information (e.g., on wages, labor hours, or consumption expenditures), we 
end up with a sample of 821 individuals.
Table  1 in online Appendix  III reports summary statistics for our sample. We 
assume that individuals spend their full potential income on four consumption cat-
egories: food, housing, leisure, and other goods. We compute leisure quantities by 
assuming that each individual needs eight hours per day for personal care and sleep. 
Leisure equals the available time that could have been spent on market work but was 
not (i.e., leisure per week = ( 24 − 8) × 7 − market work). We calculate the indi-
viduals’ weekly expenditures (i.e., nominal dollars per week) on the three remaining 
consumption categories (food, housing, and other goods) as the reported annual 
expenditures divided by 52. The price of leisure equals the individual’s hourly wage 
for market work. The prices of food, housing, and other goods are  region-speciic 
consumer price indices that have been constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
For our empirical analysis, we take it that the normality assumption is arguably 
debatable for leisure. Therefore, our following analysis will focus on two alterna-
tive scenarios: a irst one in which we assume normality for all four goods (i.e., 
 N-GARP(4)) and a second one in which we only assume normality for the consump-
tion categories food, housing, and other goods (i.e.,  N-GARP(3)). We effectively do 
believe it plausible that the  nonleisure expenditures are normal, all the more because 
they pertain to aggregate consumption categories. We will conduct a  goodness-of-it 
analysis (using the CCEI) as well as a welfare analysis (on the basis of cost-of-liv-
ing indices) for the  N-GARP conditions associated with our normality assumptions. 
We will compare (in terms of predictive success) our two  N-GARP models with 
the GARP model that makes no use of any normality assumption (recalling that 
 N-GARP reduces to GARP if no good is assumed to be normal).
In our following exercises, we will conduct separate  N-GARP-based and 
 GARP-based analyses for all 821 individuals whom we observe. Using our notation of 
Section II, this deines a dataset  S with 3 observations (i.e.,  T = {2007, 2009, 2011} ) 
and 4 goods (i.e.,  n = 4 ) for every single in our sample. By analyzing each indi-
vidual separately, we fully account for preference heterogeneity across individuals.
 Goodness-of-it.—We begin by using Afriat’s CCEI to check data consistency with 
 N-GARP and GARP for the sample of singles under study. Basically, the  GARP-based 
CCEI results reveal how well the assumption of utility maximization its the observed 
12 Practical welfare analysis of  multiperson households often adopts a unitary assumption, which models these 
households as single decision-makers. However, this unitary assumption has been rejected by a large number of 
empirical studies (see, for example, Browning and Chiappori 1998 and Dauphin et al. 2011). This suggests the 
extension of our analysis toward collective household models, with  multiperson households consisting of mul-
tiple decision-makers, as an interesting avenue of  follow-up research. Such an extension can build on Cherchye, 
De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007,  2011), who developed the revealed preference characterization of rational con-
sumption for collective households.
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behavior, while the  N-GARP-based CCEI results indicate the empirical it of our nor-
mality assumptions in addition to utility maximization. As explained in Section II, 
the CCEI evaluates model it in terms of necessary adjustments of observed expen-
ditures to obtain data consistency with the ( N-GARP and GARP) rationalizability 
conditions that are subject to evaluation.  CCEI values are situated between zero and 
one, with higher values signaling a better it.
Table 1 summarizes our CCEI results. The irst row shows the number of indi-
viduals who satisfy the exact  N-GARP and GARP conditions (corresponding to 
CCEI = 1). The second row reports the number of individuals who are very close 
to rationalizability (characterized by CCEI ≥ 0.99). Generally, the  CCEI values 
for the  N-GARP conditions are below the  CCEI values for the GARP condition. 
This should not be surprising because, as explained above, the  N-GARP condi-
tions are more stringent than the GARP condition. Importantly, we ind that the 
average  CCEI value is very high for both the  N-GARP and GARP tests: it equals 
0.9913 for  N-GARP(3), 0.9817 for  N-GARP(4), and 0.9987 for GARP. However, 
we also observe that the behavior of some individuals turns out to be quite far from 
exact rationalizability. For example, the minimum  CCEI value equals 0.6774 for 
 N-GARP(3), 0.6047 for  N-GARP(4), and 0.7451 for GARP.
Next, when comparing our indings for the  N-GARP(3) and  N-GARP(4) condi-
tions in Table 1, we observe that the  N-GARP(3) model provides a better it. Once 
more, this is actually not surprising as the models are nested; the  N-GARP(4) model 
imposes stronger normality restrictions than the  N-GARP(3) model. From now on, 
however, we mainly focus on the  N-GARP(3) setting where we assume normality 
only for the consumption categories food, housing, and other goods. The reason 
for this is that (i) a priori the assumption of leisure being a normal good is often 
debated, and (ii) by switching from  N-GARP(3) to  N-GARP(4), we lose around 
100 more observations, while the improvement in tightness of the bounds is not 
signiicantly improved (see online Appendix IV).
Overall, the results in Table  1 provide rather strong empirical support for 
 N-GARP (as well as GARP) applied to our sample of individuals. In most cases, 
we need only (very) small expenditure adjustments to obtain consistency with the 
rationalizability conditions. In our following welfare analysis, we will focus on the 
subsamples of, respectively, 702 and 595 individuals with  N-GARP(3)-based and 
 N-GARP(4)-based  CCEI values greater than or equal to 0.99. As explained above, such 
Table 1—CCEI
N-GARP(3) N-GARP(4) GARP
CCEI = 1 (percent) 587 (71.50) 424 (51.64) 782 (95.25)
CCEI ≥ 0.99 (percent) 702 (85.51) 595 (72.47) 803 (97.81)
Mean 0.9913 0.9817 0.9987
Standard deviation 0.0296 0.0435 0.0124
Min 0.6774 0.6047 0.7451
25 percent 0.9980 0.9874 1.0000
50 percent 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
75 percent 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Max 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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high  CCEI values signal behavior that is very close to exactly rationalizable, which 
empirically motivates using the assumption of rationality (with normal demand) for our 
welfare analysis. Online Appendix IV contains a robustness analysis that only includes 
the (587) individuals with  N-GARP-based CCEI equal to one (i.e., exactly rationaliz-
able behavior). Comfortingly, this additional analysis yields the same main indings.
Predictive Success.—The top part of Table 2 presents the predictive success mea-
sures for the various revealed preference conditions that are subject to evaluation. We 
consider rationalizability tests with CCEI equal to 1 and with CCEI at least 0.99. We 
also report (between square brackets) 95 percent asymptotic conidence intervals for 
the predictive success measures (obtained through the method of Demuynck 2015). 
Reassuringly, we ind that all three rationalizability conditions (GARP,  N-GARP(3), 
and  N-GARP(4)) have a predictive success that is signiicantly above zero.
The bottom part of Table 2 provides results on hypotheses tests regarding differ-
ences in predictive success for the behavioral models under consideration. We test the 
null hypothesis of equal predictive success against alternative inequality hypotheses. 
Our results indicate that both the  N-GARP(3) and  N-GARP(4) models signiicantly 
outperform the GARP model in terms of predictive success. We also check whether 
the  N-GARP(3) model performs better than the  N-GARP(4) model. Interestingly, we 
do ind that the hypothesis of equal empirical success is rejected against this alterna-
tive hypothesis when considering CCEI equal to one. However, this conclusion no 
longer holds when focusing on the slightly relaxed setting with CCEI at least 0.99.
Cost-of-living Indices.—We quantify the welfare effects of the 2008 crisis by cal-
culating cost-of-living indices. For each individual in our sample, we estimate the dif-
ference in cost of living between 2007 and 2011. More formally, we deine this as the 
difference between the actual income in 2011 and the income that would be required 
in the same year (at 2011 prices) to be equally well off as in 2007:
  c 2011,2007 =  
 x 2011 −  p 2011  h 2011,2007 
  __________________  x 2011 
 .
Table 2—Predictive Success Measures
CCEI = 1 CCEI ≥ 0.99
 N-GARP(4) 0.1784 0.3207
[0.1442, 0.2126] [0.2901, 0.3513]
 N-GARP(3) 0.2550 0.3131
[0.2241, 0.2859] [0.2890, 0.3372]
GARP 0.1405 0.1171
[0.1259, 0.1551] [0.1071, 0.1271]
 H 1 p-value p-value
 N-GARP(3) > GARP 0.0000 0.0000
 N-GARP(4) > GARP 0.0143 0.0000
 N-GARP(3) > N-GARP(4) 0.0000 0.7411
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We use the nonparametric set identiication procedure outlined above. Particularly, 
we compute  GARP-based and  N-GARP-based lower and upper bound on  c 2011,2007 
by using the rationalizability restrictions associated with GARP (in Deinition 3) 
and  N-GARP (in Deinition 5), respectively. As explained above, we focus on sub-
samples of “almost rational” individuals with an  N-GARP-based  CCEI value at 
least equal to 0.99. These subsamples contain 702 individuals for the  N-GARP(3) 
model and 595 individuals for the  N-GARP(4) model.
Tables 3 and 4 give a summary of our results for the sample of individuals under 
study. Columns  2–7 summarize our  N-GARP-based bounds and columns  8–10 
our  GARP-based bounds. Correspondingly,  Δ n in column 4 and  Δ g in column 7 
represent the differences between the respective upper and lower bounds. Finally, 
column 8 reports on the relative difference between  Δ n and  Δ g . This measures 
the extent to which the  N-GARP-based bounds are tighter than the  GARP-based 
bounds. In a sense, it quantiies the identifying power that speciically follows from 
our normality assumptions.
We observe that both the  N-GARP(3)-based and the  N-GARP(4)-based bounds 
are substantially tighter than the  GARP-based bounds. The mean (respectively, 
median) differences between the  N-GARP-based lower and upper bounds are 7 per-
cent and 4.3 percent (respectively, 2.9 percent and 1.2 percent) for the  N-GARP(3) 
and  N-GARP(4) subsamples, which is much below the differences of 14.4 per-
cent and 15.3 percent (respectively, 9.4 percent and 9.9 percent) between the 
 GARP-based bounds for the same subsamples. Moreover, the relative difference 
Table 4—Bounds on  c 2011,2007 for the  N-GARP(4) Subsample (595 Individuals)
 N-GARP(4)-based  GARP-based
  
 Δ g −  Δ n1 
 _
 Δ g 
 Lower Upper  Δ n Lower Upper  Δ g 
Mean −0.036 0.007 0.043 −0.038 0.114 0.153 0.758
Standard deviation 0.263 0.227 0.117 0.264 0.253 0.176 0.244
Min −3.044 −1.624 0.000 −3.044 −1.578 0.002 0.000
25 percent −0.124 −0.084 0.003 −0.124 0.000 0.043 0.636
50 percent −0.006 0.003 0.012 −0.007 0.046 0.099 0.835
75 percent 0.084 0.113 0.041 0.083 0.260 0.200 0.951
Max 0.831 0.897 2.099 0.830 0.899 2.285 1.000
 
Table 3—Bounds on  c 2011,2007 for the  N-GARP(3) Subsample (702 Individuals)
 N-GARP(3)-based  GARP-based
  
 Δ g −  Δ n 
 _
 Δ g 
 Lower Upper  Δ n Lower Upper  Δ g 
Mean −0.037 0.033 0.070 −0.038 0.107 0.144 0.469
Standard deviation 0.288 0.247 0.131 0.288 0.279 0.168 0.391
Min −3.044 −2.492 0.000 −3.044 −2.489 0.000 0.000
25 percent −0.120 −0.042 0.008 −0.120 0.000 0.042 0.011
50 percent −0.005 0.008 0.029 −0.006 0.040 0.094 0.500
75 percent 0.083 0.131 0.076 0.083 0.255 0.193 0.865
Max 0.830 0.897 2.099 0.830 0.899 2.285 1.000
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between  Δ n and  Δ g amounts to no less than 50 percent for about half of our sample, 
again showing a signiicant increase of identifying power when imposing normality.
As a following exercise, Figures 3 and 4 depict the empirical cumulative distri-
bution functions (CDFs) of our  N-GARP-based and  GARP-based lower and upper 
bounds for  c 2011,2007 . In line with our results in Tables 3 and 4, the  N-GARP-based 
CDFs are much closer to each other than the  GARP-based CDFs. From all this, we 
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Figure 3. CDF of  N-GARP(3)-based Bounds
Figure 4. CDF of NGARP(4)-based Bounds
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may safely conclude that our (mild) normality assumptions do yield a consider-
ably more informative welfare analysis. Further inspection of Tables 3 and 4 and 
Figures 3 and 4 reveals that for our speciic data, this improvement in identifying 
power is mostly driven by lower upper bounds (and to a lesser degree by higher 
lower bounds).
 Better-off and  Worse-off Individuals.—As explained in Section II, we can state 
that an individual is better off in 2011 than in 2007 if the lower bound of  c 2011,2007 
(LB) exceeds zero, while the individual is worse off in 2011 if the upper bound 
of  c 2011,2007 (UB) is below zero. These  better-off and  worse-off classiications are 
robust in that they hold for any speciication of the individual utilities that rational-
ize the observed consumption behavior. Finally, if the lower and upper bounds have 
opposite signs (i.e., LB ≤ 0 and UB ≥ 0), we cannot robustly conclude that the 
individual is better- or worse-off in 2011.
Rows  2–4 of Tables 5 and 6 give the fractions of individuals who are classiied 
as  better off,  worse off, and  cannot say according to our  N-GARP-based (column 3) 
and  GARP-based (column 4) bounds for  c 2011,2007 . Using our  N-GARP(3)-based and 
 N-GARP(4)-based bounds, we classify respectively 33.05  percent and 49.08 per-
cent of our individuals as worse off and 47.86 percent and 47.90 percent of the indi-
viduals as better off, with a residual 19.09 percent and 3.03 percent falling in the 
 cannot say category. By contrast, our  GARP-based bounds classify only 22.36 per-
cent ( N-GARP(3) subsample) and 22.86 percent ( N-GARP(4) subsample) of the 
individuals as worse off and, respectively, 47.58 percent and 47.56 percent as better 
off, now leaving about 30 percent of the individuals in the  cannot say category. We 
see that particularly, the fraction of individuals in the  worse-off category is sub-
stantially higher in the  N-GARP-based analyses than in the  GARP-based analysis. 
Correspondingly, the fraction of individuals in the  cannot say category is lower in 
the  N-GARP-based classiications than in the  GARP-based classiication. These 
indings show that using normality assumptions obtains a signiicantly more infor-
mative classiication of individuals after the 2008 crisis. Particularly, the  N-GARP 
Table 6— Worse-off and  Better-off Individuals for the  N-GARP(4) Subsample
 N-GARP(4) GARP
UB < 0 Worse-off in 2011 49.08 22.86
LB > 0 Better-off in 2011 47.90 47.56
LB ≤ 0 and 0 ≥ UB Cannot say 3.03 29.58
 
Table 5— Worse-off and Better-off Individuals for the  N-GARP(3) Subsample
 N-GARP(3) GARP
UB < 0 Worse-off in 2011 33.05 22.36
LB > 0 Better-off in 2011 47.86 47.58
LB ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ UB Cannot say 19.09 30.06
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restrictions for rational behavior enable a considerably better identiication of the 
individuals who suffered from a welfare loss after the 2008 crisis.
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 provide further support for our earlier conclusion that 
(mild) normality assumptions can substantially improve the informative value of 
nonparametric welfare analysis. Moreover, our cost of living estimates reveal con-
siderable some heterogeneity across individuals. In online Appendix IV, we inves-
tigate this further by relating these cost of living estimates to observable individual 
characteristics. A main inding is that individuals with higher potential incomes in 
2007 have been hit more severely by the crisis.13 Next, we also observe that having 
children correlates signiicantly with our estimated welfare effects. At this point, 
it is worth recalling that our empirical analysis considers singles who remained 
employed after the crisis. This contrasts with existing studies, which mainly focused 
on the extensive margin of labor supply.
IV. Conclusion
We presented a revealed preference characterization of rational consumer behav-
ior under the assumption of normal demand. The characterization is easily opera-
tionalized in practice, and it is lexible in that it can impose normality on any subset 
of goods. We have also shown the use of our characterization to analyze the welfare 
effects (in terms of cost-of-living indices) of changing  price-income regimes. As 
normality is often a plausible assumption to make, this provides a useful tool kit to 
remediate the lack of power that is frequently associated with empirical revealed 
preference analysis.
We used our novel methodology to evaluate the welfare impact of the 2008 
inancial crisis for individuals situated on the intensive margin of labor supply. 
Particularly, we studied the labor supply behavior of a sample of singles drawn 
from the PSID. Our main focus was on comparing the  goodness-of-it and iden-
tifying power of our nonparametric characterization of utility maximization, with 
and without normality assumptions. We found that the  goodness-of-it results were 
hardly affected when imposing normality, providing good empirical support for our 
normality hypotheses. Next, and more importantly, we showed that using mild nor-
mality assumptions yields a substantially more powerful empirical welfare analysis: 
it obtained considerably sharper set identiication of individuals’ cost-of-living indi-
ces and a signiicantly more informative classiication of  better-off and  worse-off 
individuals after the 2008 crisis.
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